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Abstract: 
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders.  Is  provision  harder if 
contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an 
experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels 
whenever actors risk falling back behind bystanders.  The mere presence of unaffected 
bystanders already dampens contributions. This behavior seems to result from the interplay of 
two motives: the desire to realize opportunities for joint gains, and concerns for comparative 
performance. Individual payoff comparisons to the other actors as well as to  individual 
bystanders drive contributions down. 
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1.  Introduction 
The essence of many social problems is the temptation to free ride on others’ 
contributions  to the provision of a public good. This essence has been backed by a rich 
experimental literature (Ledyard 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000; van Dijk, Sonnemans et al. 
2002; Masclet, Noussair et al. 2003; Page, Putterman et al. 2005; Potters, Sefton et al. 2005) 
and is corroborated in the field (Ostrom, Dietz et al. 2002; Anderson, Mellor et al. 2004; 
Andersen, Bulte et al. 2008). Behavioral research has shown that the core of the problem is 
not naked greed, but a hurt sense of fairness. In experimental populations many participants 
“conditionally cooperate”. They are happy to make substantial contributions to a joint project 
as long as they believe a sufficient portion of others will do so as well (Keser and van Winden 
2000; Brandts and Schram 2001; Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; Frey and Meier 2004; 
Croson, Fatas et al. 2005; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). The important news for policy 
makers is that it need not be necessary to force everyone to contribute. It may be enough to 
make sure that the risk of being the sucker is not too strong, or too salient. 
Yet unfortunately political reality is often more complex. Public good provision is often local 
and also affects people outside the borders of the community. Equatorial countries preserving 
the rain forest do not only save their national ecosystems, but the world’s climate and 
biodiversity along with it. If a metropolitan area subsidizes the opera house, it attracts visitors 
from further away who do not pay local taxes. In these examples public goods provision is not 
only domestically valuable but additionally creates a positive externality for outsiders. On the 
other hand, the successful provision of a (local) public good may create negative external 
effects. Take a country close to the source of an international river, building a dam to secure 
irrigation water and energy for its population. This deprives countries closer to the estuary of 
the river’s benefits. Or, think of a municipality constructing a landfill close to its borders to 
keep garbage off its streets. This puts the groundwater in the neighboring community at risk. 
Of course, one of the economically most prominent examples for negative externalities of 
cooperation is the formation of a cartel. Successful cooperation among suppliers imposes 
damage on customers. 
How does the existence of external effects affect public goods provision? Do positive external 
effects make provision “easier” while negative external effects decelerate the provision 
process? In this paper we tackle this question experimentally as well as theoretically. We 
model a linear public goods game with externalities on bystanders. In the positive externality 
treatments bystanders profit and in the negative externality treatments they suffer from the   2 
actors’ contributions to the public good. In the no externality treatment bystanders are present, 
but  their payoff is unaffected  by the actors’ provisions.  The situation is asymmetric as 
bystanders have no direct means to influence the actors’ payoffs. We not only vary the 
direction of the externality, but also vary the initial endowment of bystanders. That way, we 
are able to disentangle the effect of the direction of the externality from the effect of payoff 
differences between actors and bystanders.  
Our experiments provide us with remarkable results. Already the mere presence of unaffected 
bystanders with the same endowment as actors substantially reduces contributions to the 
public good. Indeed, contributions are also reduced if bystanders have a higher endowment 
than actors, be that in a positive or in a negative externality case. If, however, in the positive 
externality case,  bystanders are poorer than actors or,  in the negative externality case, 
bystanders and actors have the same endowments, actors’ contributions are not significantly 
different from the case of no bystanders.  
We explain these observations with a combination of two motivating forces, neither of which 
would be sufficient in isolation to explain our data. Narrowly self-interested  participants 
expecting a sufficient fraction of other active players to be cooperative may contribute in a 
finitely repeated game, but this cannot explain the observed treatment differences. Social 
preferences in the form of inequity aversion alone would only provide an explanation of the 
observed  treatment differences if all actors shared  an  implausibly high aversion to 
outperforming others. We show that the interaction of repeated game effects and inequity 
aversion explains our observations. Actors cooperate the more, the more others cooperate, but 
additionally condition their contributions on the past difference between their own payoff and 
the payoff of the other actors as well as the payoff difference to the passive bystanders. If 
unaffected bystanders have the same endowment as actors, contributing actors risk receiving a 
lower payoff than bystanders. This risk is even more pronounced if bystanders have a higher 
endowment than actors, be that in a positive or in a negative externality case. This risk of 
falling behind bystanders significantly reduces actors’ contributions in these cases and leads 
to significantly lower contributions than absent any bystanders.  In comparative terms, 
however, poor bystanders in the positive externality case and equally endowed bystanders in 
the negative externality case are still worse off than actors making positive contributions. In 
these treatments, since negative payoff comparisons with respect to bystanders are not an 
issue, actors contribute as long as the others do so as well, and contributions are not different 
from the baseline of no bystanders.    3 
Our results point to a limitation of self-governance. Conditional cooperators need institutions 
to protect  them  against the  risk of being the sucker, especially with respect to outsiders 
gaining a windfall profit. By design, the institutional environment of our experiment did not 
provide this protection. In this light, going back to our examples, it becomes understandable 
why equatorial countries are compensated for preserving the rain forest by being exempted 
from the obligation to reduce CO2 emissions; or why municipalities tax secondary residences, 
using the second home as a proxy for the benefit from local public goods. 
One could think of even more general policy implications of these findings. As long as states 
would  strictly  maximize  the aggregate utility of their citizens, many transnational public 
goods would be provided. Even if other states receive a windfall profit, the benefit for the 
nationals of the providing state would often still be large enough. Yet government has to 
defend higher taxes and onerous regulation vis-à-vis the citizenry. Not so rarely, political 
support for an otherwise sensible intervention falters if this gives outsiders a free lunch. A 
striking illustration is defense. Often, if one country disciplines a rogue state, many other 
countries benefit as well, yet save their soldiers’ lives. And one sees why federations like the 
United States of America and confederations like the European Union have grown so large: 
under the federal umbrella, beneficiaries cannot so easily escape contributing their fair share. 
From a policy perspective, our finding on the mere presence of bystanders is no less 
troublesome. If those who are asked to contribute run the risk of falling behind members of an 
external benchmark group, this aggravates the social dilemma. In political reality, in the short 
run benchmarks escape the control of policy makers. The media can always draw unfavorable 
comparisons. Yet in the long run, political action can change with whom citizens compare 
themselves.  
Of course, all our examples are embedded in a much richer environment than the one we 
modeled  in our  experimental game. Yet in all examples, the underlying conflict has the 
structure of a public goods dilemma for the internals, and it invites potentially unfavorable 
comparisons with outsiders. If internal cooperation engenders a  positive or negative 
externality, for actors their comparative position is not a given, but open to their action. Our 
results suggest that  policy makers should be concerned that conditional cooperation is 
hampered when internal cooperation worsens the competitive position of actors, compared 
with the outsiders.   4 
In section 2 we discuss the related experimental literature. In section 3 we introduce the game 
and in section 4 we embed our research question into the theoretical literature and derive 
hypotheses  to be tested with our data in section 5. Section 6 concludes. The appendices 
provide supplementary material, including the instructions.   
2.  Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge no experimental  study on public goods provision with 
externalities on inactive others has been conducted so far. Surprisingly, even in other contexts 
there are only a few studies which have aspects of externalities. Güth and van Damme (1998) 
present an ultimatum game with an externality on an inactive third player who has no say. The 
proposer offers how to divide the pie between three players. The division is executed if and 
only if the responder accepts. Otherwise, all three players receive nothing. The externality is 
the same in all treatments. If the responder only learns how much the proposer wants to 
allocate to the outsider, proposals are lowest. They are intermediate if the proposer only learns 
how much she gets in case she accepts. They are highest if the responder fully knows how the 
proposer wants to distribute the pie.  Bolton and Ockenfels (2010)  have an active player 
choose between a safe option and a lottery. Both affect an inactive outsider. If the safe option 
gives the active player a lower payoff than the inactive one, players choose the lottery more 
often. Abbink (2005) plays a two-person bribery game in which corruption negatively affects 
passive workers. He concludes that reciprocity between briber and official overrules concerns 
about distributive fairness towards other members of the society.  Ellman and Pezanis-
Christou  (2010)  study how a  firm’s organizational structure influences ethical behavior 
towards passive outsiders. A firm of two players decides on its production strategy, which 
influences a passive third player. They find that horizontally organized firms in which the 
firm’s decision corresponds to the average of both individual decisions are less likely to harm 
the outsider than consensus-based firms or firms in which one of both members is the boss.  
Studies with effects on active others are more common. Bornstein and colleagues extensively 
study team competition in various contexts (for an overview see Bornstein 2003) and find that 
in social dilemmas the competition with another group increases in-group cooperation. 
Abbink, Brandts et al. (2010) find that group members punish each other more severely if the 
group is in conflict with another group. The group position may be interpreted as a joint 
project of the group. Okada and Riedl (2005); Kosfeld, Okada et al. (2009) study endogenous 
group formation in a public-goods setting. Players may declare their interest in an 
organization that demands  full contributions of its members. Implementation of the   5 
organization is costly and requires the anonymous approval of all those interested. Non-
members of the organization freely determine the size of their contribution to the public good. 
Both  groups (members and non-members)  contribute to a global public good. Thus, in 
contrast to our study, contributions of both groups have mutual positive effects and group 
association is endogenous, while we impose it. Kosfeld et al. find that in 70 to 100 percent of 
cases an organization was implemented in the final (of 20) rounds. Remarkably, around 75 
percent of these organizations included all participants. If public goods are nested, such that 
simultaneously an inner and an outer group are affected, contribution patterns are sensitive to 
which dimension of the externality is made salient (Wit and Kerr 2002). If the marginal per 
capita rate for the global public good exceeds the marginal per capita rate for the local public 
good, participants contribute more to the global good, without reducing contributions to the 
local good (Blackwell and McKee 2003). Participants give more to the global good, the more 
a country is exposed to globalization (Buchan, Grimalda et al. 2009).  
In an indirect way, the experimental literature on oligopoly also provides evidence. Collusion 
is significantly lower if the opposite market side is represented by real subjects (collusion 
rates of about 7%), rather  than a computer bidding a predetermined demand function 
(collusion rates of about 43%) (cf. the meta-study by Engel 2007). This might indicate that 
participants shy away from imposing harm on other participants, which would imply that 
cooperation is lower if it entails a negative externality.  
3.  A Public Goods Game with Externalities 
We  introduce a linear  public goods game in which public goods  provision  may  cause 
externalities to non-actors. The game consists of  0 > A n  active players, the actors, and  0 ≥ B n  
passive players, the bystanders. Actors are endowed with  A e  and may contribute any amount 
A i e g ≤ ≤ 0  to a public good, which benefits all actors. As in a standard public goods game, 







is augmented by  A n a⋅   and  then equally 
distributed among the actors. The parameter  1 1 < < a
A n  is the marginal per capita rate (MPCR) 
that specifies the marginal individual return each actor receives from her own contribution to 
the public good. The actors’ payoff is given in equation (1):   6 
(1)  A i A
A
i n i aG g e ,..., 1 , = + − = π    
Bystanders  receive an endowment  B e   and  cannot contribute to the public good. But  – 
dependent on the parameter b – they either benefit from ( 0 > b ), suffer from ( 0 < b ), or are 
unaffected by ( 0 = b ) the contributions of the actors. Accordingly, for a given b all bystanders 
earn an identical payoff which is solely determined by the actors’ actions and is out of the 
bystanders’ control. The profit function of bystanders is given by equation (2). 
(2)  bG eB
B + = π    
 
Experimental Implementation 
In our experimental implementation we set the endowment of actors to be  20 = A e , and keep 
4 . 0 = a  fixed. For the sake of comparability we choose parameters that are standard in public 
goods experiments without externalities
1. Our treatment subject groups consist of 7 subjects, 
4 = A n  actors and  3 = B n  bystanders. We have chosen 3 bystanders so that the number of 
insiders remains larger (and therefore arguably more important), but that the number of 
bystanders is substantial. Our control subject group consists of  4 = A n   actors and no 
bystanders ( 0 = B n ). In all treatments, subjects play the above game repeatedly over 10 
announced  rounds  in fixed groups. We restrict  the contribution rates to be either 
, 10 , 0 = = g g   or  20 = g .  This limitation of the action space makes sure that upward or 
downward shifts from period to period are large. We can therefore be sure that changes in 
contributions are meaningful. We use changes in contributions to test our theoretical 
expectations about  driving forces for treatment differences. Both active players and 
bystanders receive feedback about the sum of the contributions of all active players, their own 
period payoff and the period payoff of each bystander. From the instructions all participants 
know  the actors’ payoff function, and are thereby indirectly informed  about the average 
performance of the (remaining) actors.  
                                                 
1 In the meta-study by Zelmer (2003) on 27 studies with 711 distinct groups, the mean MCPR was 0.404 and the 
average number of periods was 10.4.   7 
In our six treatments, we vary parameters in two dimensions. We first vary the way in which 
bystanders are influenced by the contributions of actors, i.e. we vary b. In the positive 
externality treatments PE, we set  2 . 0 = b . In the negative externality treatments  NE, we set 
2 . 0 − = b . The choice of b follows the same logic as the composition of the group. We want to 
study a case where the externality matters, but less so than the effect of contributions on 
insiders. In the no externality treatment Nox7, we set  0 = b . Our second source of variation is 
the endowment bystanders receive upfront in every round. We implement symmetric and 
asymmetric endowments. In the symmetric treatments Nox7, PE20, NE20, bystanders have 
the same endowment of 20 tokens as have actors. In the interest of disentangling the effects 
caused by the direction of the externality and effects caused by payoff differences, we also 
vary bystander endowment. Treatment PE0 gives bystanders no upfront endowment. In this 
treatment, active players can never fall behind bystanders. In the same spirit, treatment NE60 
makes bystanders so rich (with an endowment of 60) that active players have a lower payoff, 
however they perform. Whenever actors make positive contributions to the public good, 
bystanders are worse off in NE20. It therefore did not seem necessary to test a situation where 
bystanders have an endowment of zero and have to pay the experimenter in case of any 
cooperation. However, the opposite case is of interest. Is the willingness to contribute in-
fluenced if bystanders who were affluent in the first place get a windfall profit? This we test 
in treatment PE40. Finally, to have a proper benchmark, we compare all treatments to a 
standard voluntary contribution mechanism in a group of four, our control treatment Nox4. 
We thus compare all treatments with a baseline where bystanders are neither affected by inter-
nal cooperation, nor even present in the lab. Table 1 summarizes experimental parameters. 


















Nox4  4  0  20  -  0.4  - 
Nox7  4  3  20  20  0.4  0 
PE0  4  3  20  0  0.4  0.2 
PE20  4  3  20  20  0.4  0.2 
PE40  4  3  20  40  0.4  0.2 
NE20  4  3  20  20  0.4  -0.2 
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In  treatment  Nox7  and in all  positive externality treatments,  contributions both serve the 
augmentation of the actors’ profit and the joint payoff of actors and bystanders. Thus, joint 
payoff maximization demands full contributions of all actors, independent of whether the 
actors strive for maximizing the joint profit of actors alone or the joint profit of actors and 
bystanders.  With  negative externalities,  in principle there is potential for a motivational 
conflict between augmenting the joint payoff of actors and reducing the joint payoff of all 7 
participants. To rule out that conflict, and to have more scope for disentangling motives, we 
chose parameters that yield constant joint payoffs. In our negative externality settings actors’ 
joint profit is  G eA
A ⋅ + ⋅ = Π 6 . 0 4  and bystanders’ joint profit is  G eB
B ⋅ − ⋅ = Π 6 . 0 3 . Thus, the 
net gain of actors is exactly identical to the net loss of bystanders. This choice of parameters 
makes sure that contributing actors cannot be motivated by efficiency. Whatever actors do for 
themselves is to the detriment of bystanders and neutral to the entire “society”. This way, they 
cannot assuage bad feelings by an efficiency excuse. 
Conduct of the Experiment 
The experiment was run at the University of Erfurt (elab) with a computerized interaction 
using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects that never played a public goods experiment were 
invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Each subject played in one of the seven parameter 
constellations (six treatments  and control) and no subject played in more than one. We 
collected nine independent observations in each parameter constellation, adding up  to  63 
independent observations with a total of 414 subjects of various majors.
2  
4.  Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 
Narrowly self-interested actors, i.e. actors solely motivated by the maximization of their own 
monetary gains, are completely unaffected by the presence of bystanders and follow their 
dominant strategy of free-riding on the public good provision. Consequently, contributions of 
zero prescribe the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game and, under common knowledge 
of rationality, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated game. There are 
                                                 
2   Each session lasted about one hour and subjects earned on average 15.18 € in the control Nox4, 14.19 € 
in treatment Nox7 (14.29 € for actors, and 14.06 € for bystanders), 11.30 € in treatment PE0 (12.35 € for actors, 
and 9.90 € for bystanders), 14.79 € in treatment PE20 (14.76 € for actors, and 14.84 € for bystanders), 13 € in 
treatment NE20 (13.29 € for actors, and 12.61 € for bystanders) and 20.71 € in treatment NE60 (18.32 € for 
actors, and 23.90 € for bystanders).   9 
no treatment differences.  The actors’ as well as the bystanders’ payoff is the initial 
endowment  A e  and  B e , respectively.  
In recent years considerable experimental evidence has been collected on subjects’ provision 
behavior in public goods games, showing systematic deviations from this prediction. In one-
stage games subjects typically contribute about 40-60% of their endowment. In repeated 
interactions subjects typically start off in about the same range, but over the course of the 
interaction contributions decrease to very low levels (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Keser and van 
Winden 2000; Brandts and Schram 2001; Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; Zelmer 2003; 
Chaudhuri 2011). The obvious explanation that the low contribution levels in advanced 
periods are due to subjects’ learning of the free-riding incentives has lost bite in the 
observation of a considerable increase of cooperation after a “restart” (Andreoni 1988). A 
prominent  explanation of contribution patterns is conditional cooperation. Conditionally 
cooperative subjects cooperate if they expect other subjects to cooperate as well and free-ride 
otherwise. In direct tests, about half of the subjects have been classified as conditional 
cooperators, while 20-33% were identified as free-riders (Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; 
Kurzban and Houser 2005; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).  
Although conditional cooperation is a well established explanation for the contribution 
patterns observed in public goods games, there is no general theory of conditional 
cooperation. The modifications of the standard model that allow for (conditional) cooperation 
in equilibrium are  based  on different forces driving this behavior. Kreps, Milgrom et al. 
(1982)  showed that when abandoning common knowledge of rationality and assuming 
incomplete information about the other player’s type, cooperation may occur in a sequential 
equilibrium of the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. Narrowly self-interested players 
conditionally cooperate in equilibrium if both of them believe that there is a small chance that 
the opponent achieves extra utility from mutual cooperation (altruist) or adopts a tit-for-tat 
strategy. In fact, altruistic players do not have to exist; the belief of their existence is 
sufficient to sustain cooperation. If altruistic players actually exist, defection may no longer 
be a best reply to cooperation and conditional cooperation may even occur in the one-stage 
prisoners’ dilemma game (Andreoni and Miller 1993; Cooper, DeJong et al. 1996). This 
explanation exclusively hinges on the cooperation  preferences of active players  and the 
information thereof. Adding passive players should not affect the results. If this was the (sole) 
driving force of conditional cooperation, we should therefore not see treatment differences.   10 
In recent years various models assuming a wider notion of self-interest have been proposed 
(Sobel 2005; Fehr and Schmidt 2006). Players act to maximize their utility, which is not 
solely influenced by their monetary gain, but also by concerns for other players 
(interdependent  or  other-regarding preferences)  (Rabin 1993;  Levine 1998;  Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999;  Bolton and Ockenfels 2000;  Charness and Rabin 2002;  Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004). Out of different motivations, these theories allow for conditionally 
cooperative behavior to be  an  equilibrium of one-stage games, either in terms of 
“conventional” or psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce et al. 1989).  
Rabin’s (1993) model of intention based reciprocity is pioneering as it allows for multiple 
equilibria in psychological two player games in which players act reciprocally based on the 
other player’s intentions. If a player is perceived to be kind, the opponent wants to be kind too 
and vice versa. Consequently conditionally cooperative behavior may be observed in 
equilibrium. Rabin’s model has been extended and generalized, e.g. by Charness and Rabin 
(2002), by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) to N-person extensive form games and by 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) to combine inequity aversion with intentions. In any way the 
perception of the opponent’s intentions depends on the player’s belief about why the opponent 
is acting this way. Levine (1998) assumes in his model of interdependent preferences that a 
player’s utility not only depends on her monetary payoff, but also on the other players’ types. 
A player acts more cooperatively towards an altruistic than towards a spiteful type. When 
another player’s type is not known, initial beliefs are updated through observed behavior. 
What happens –  ceteris paribus –  when passive bystanders are added to intention based 
models or Levine’s model of interdependent preferences? Although we cannot rule out that 
actors  have initial beliefs about the kindness and the spitefulness  of the bystanders, the 
bystanders’ passivity does not allow collecting any information to update these priors. 
Evidently, bystander effects are not in the core focus of these theories and they do not allow 
us to predict how treatment differences affect contributions.  
Models of inequity aversion assume that players compare their payoff to the payoffs of the 
other players, either individually (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or on an aggregated level (Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2000). In the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, actors gain utility from their 
monetary payoff and disutility both from having a payoff disadvantage and from having a 
payoff advantage in comparison to each of the other players. Complete free-riding of all 
actors also constitutes an equilibrium in the Fehr-Schmidt model, but there may be additional 
equilibria of the one-shot game in which at least some actors contribute a positive amount.   11 
These equilibria require a sufficient number of actors who sufficiently suffer from a payoff 
difference to their advantage. These  actors  have no incentive to deviate  to a lower 
contribution because the monetary advantage is more than eaten up by the disutility of 
outperforming their peers. Then players no longer have the dominant strategy of free-riding, 
but may cooperate if they expect others to cooperate, and free-ride if they expect others to 
free-ride. This implies that inequity averse players act as conditional cooperators.  
In models of inequity aversion passive bystanders potentially affect actors’ behavior, because 
payoff comparisons are independent of the strategic possibilities of the other players. As we 
show in more detail in Appendix B, the predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model vary with the 
treatment parameterizations. All treatment variations, even the one with unaffected bystanders 
(Nox7), strengthen the requirements for equilibria with positive contributions, as compared to 
the standard public goods game without bystanders (Nox4). This means that adding 
bystanders reduces the chances to observe conditionally cooperative behavior. There are, 
however, treatment differences. When bystanders have high initial endowments (PE40 and 
NE60) or when endowments are equal and the externality is positive (PE20) there are no 
equilibria  with positive contributions and complete free-riding constitutes the unique 
equilibrium. Thus, inequity aversion leaves no room for conditional cooperation. If bystanders 
are unaffected (Nox7), have low endowments (PE0) or are equally endowed and negatively 
affected (NE20), equilibria with positive contribution levels (10 or 20) are possible if actors 
are sufficiently averse against advantageous inequality. Thus, in the presence of bystanders 
we should most likely expect to observe conditionally cooperative  behavior  in these 
treatments.  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose an alternative model of inequity aversion, which also 
allows for equilibria with conditionally cooperative behavior. Next to their monetary payoff, 
subjects are motivated by the comparison of their individual payoff to the average payoff of 
all players. In that comparison, achieving exactly the average payoff creates the highest 
utility, whereas achieving a payoff below (above) average creates incentives to reduce 
(increase) cooperation. Also in the Bolton-Ockenfels model, complete free-riding is an 
equilibrium. But, if the probability that others cooperate is high enough, cooperation is a best 
reply. How does the addition of passive bystanders affect the payoff average? In Nox7, PE0, 
and NE20 actors’ payoff is (weakly) above the average payoff of all players (actors and 
bystanders together). By increasing the contribution an actor – ceteris paribus – increases all 
other actors’ payoffs in each of these three treatments. In Nox7  bystanders’ payoffs are   12 
unaffected by the actors’ increase, while in PE0 also bystanders’ payoff is increased and in 
NE20 bystanders’ payoff is decreased. In these treatments, conditionally cooperative behavior 
may be expected. In PE20, PE40, and NE60 actors’ payoff is (weakly) below the average 
payoff of all players. Thus, actors want to reduce the payoffs of all other players. Since 
contributing to the public good increases the payoffs of the other actors and in PE20 and 
PE40 additionally the payoffs of the bystanders, actors are not expected to do so. Thus, also 
under inequity aversion à la Bolton-Ockenfels conditional cooperation should not be expected 
in PE20, PE40, and NE60.  
The embedding of our experimental setting into a theoretical framework and the analysis of 
whether and how the predictions of these theories change – ceteris paribus – when adding 
bystanders to the public goods game can be summarized in the following hypotheses: 
(H1)  We expect to observe no treatment differences (i.e. no effect of the presence and the 
externality on bystanders) and…  
a.  … no cooperation, when all actors are solely motivated by the maximization 
of their monetary gains and this is common knowledge.  
b.  … conditional cooperation, when actors believe that some other actors gain 
sufficient utility from cooperating. 
(H2)  We expect to observe treatment differences (i.e. an effect of the presence of and the 
externality on bystanders) and conditional cooperation in the stage game if actors 
hold other-regarding preferences in the form of inequity aversion with the following 
treatment differences:  
a.  In the absence of bystanders (Nox4) cooperation is higher than in any of the 
treatments with bystanders (including the case of unaffected bystanders, 
Nox7).  
b.  In the presence of bystanders cooperation is most likely to be observed in 
Nox7, PE0, and NE20 and not expected to be observed in PE20, PE40 and 
NE60. 
   13 
5.  Results 
To test the  hypotheses, we analyze our experimental data at two levels. We first  check 
whether contributions differ between treatments. This leads to a first discrimination between 
theories. In the next step we analyze how individual participants adjust their contributions to 
information from past play. Special focus will be put on the benchmarks suggested by the 
theoretical considerations in section 4.  A more detailed  explanation  of our strategies  for 
parametric estimation is given in the Appendix. The reported two-sided non-parametric Mann 
Whitney u-tests  are performed on  mean contributions per  subject group, i.e. on the 
independent observations.  
5.1 Contributions on an Aggregate Level 
In one respect, all our treatments differ from the baseline: active players are aware of the fact 
that there are three more participants in their group, be they affected by the active players’ 
decisions or not. Figure 1A shows that this difference alone influences active players’ 
behavior. Contributions are significantly higher when actors are alone than when bystanders 
are present.
3 Actually, the mere presence of bystanders, although being unaffected, suffices to 
significantly reduce actors’ contributions (see Figure1 B).
4 Both results support (H2a). 
Result 1: Not being alone reduces contributions. 
    
 
Figure 1 
Contributions in the Absence and in the Presence of Bystanders 
A: Nox4 vs. all other treatments, B: Nox4 vs. Nox7 
                                                 
3   Note that the upward movement from period 1 to 2 in Nox4 is what one should expect if participants 
follow the Kreps Wilson logic. In early rounds of a repeated game it pays to give cooperation a chance. An 
upward movement results if sufficiently many players are positively surprised by the cooperativeness of the 
remaining group members. Comparable patterns have also been found by other researchers, e.g. Fehr Gächter 
AER 2000, Figure 3. We find a similar pattern in our treatments NE20, PE40, NE60. 
4   The two-sided Mann Whitney u-test between Nox4 vs. all other treatments yields p = .0966 (N=63); 
between Nox4 vs. Nox7 it yields p = .0631 (N=18). The regression analyses in Table 2, Models 1 and 2, show 
that “not being alone” significantly (p<.05) decreases contributions.  





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
without bystanders (NoX4)
with unaffected bystanders (NoX7)
B  14 
Contribution 
Pooled             No 
externality 
Positive Externality  Negative Externality 
≠ Nox4  Nox7   PE 0   PE 20   PE 40   NE 20   NE 60  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
not being 
alone 
-.299*  -.425*  .012  -.426*  -.367*  -.200  -.369* 
Period  -.096***  -.088***  -.083***  -.081***  -.099***  -.106***  -.080*** 
cut 10  -.596***  -.820***  -.814***  -.836***  -.929***  -.943***  -.794*** 
cut 20  .730***  .421***  .483**  .542**  .432*  .363*  .484** 
P model  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001  <.001 
N  2520  720  720  720  720  720  720 
 
Table 2 
The Effect of Not Being Alone
5 
random effects ordered probit, bootstrapped 50 reps, clustered at the group level 
Hausman tests on mirror linear random effects models insignificant 
reference category Nox4 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
 
   
Figure 2 
Contributions in the Presence or Absence of Positive Externalities 
A: Comparing Nox4 with PE0, B: Comparing Nox4 with PE 20 and PE40 
If the mere presence of bystanders already influences contributions, what happens if active 
players’ contributions to the public good impact on bystander profit? With positive 
externalities, contributions are significantly lower than absent any bystanders (Nox4) if 
bystanders are sufficiently rich (in PE20 and PE40); however, if bystanders are “poor” (PE0), 
contributions are not distinguishable from the situation without bystanders (see Figure 2).
6 
                                                 
5   A detailed reading and interpretation aid is given in Box B2 in the Appendix. 
6   Mann Whitney u-test, PE 0 vs. Nox4, p = .7235; PE 20 vs. Nox4, p = .0574; PE 40 vs. Nox4, p = .0843 
(N = 18 in each comparison). The regression analyses are provided in Table 2, Models 3-5.   
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Likewise in NE20 we do not detect any significant difference to the case without bystanders, 
while we establish a significant difference between NE60 and Nox4 (see Figure 3).
7 
 
    
 
Figure 3 
Contributions in the Presence or Absence of Negative Externalities 
A: Comparing Nox4 with NE20, B: Comparing Nox4 with NE60 
Result 2: Contributions display treatment differences, but different from the mere direction of 
the externality. 
The fact that contributions are strictly positive in all treatments speaks against narrowly self-
interested subjects that solely maximize their payoff and believe all other participants to do 
the same (H1a). The fact that contributions differ across treatments speaks against narrowly 
self-interested subjects who contribute because they believe that others gain utility from 
cooperation (H1b) as the sole explanation. Similarly, our results cannot be simply explained 
by the direction of the externality. The driving force behind our data seems to be more 
complex than active players being reticent to impose harm on innocent outsiders, and being 
encouraged to contribute if this  pays  a double dividend for  outsiders.  The analysis of 
contribution dynamics lets us see driving forces more clearly, and lets us address (H2). 
 
5.2 Contributions Dynamics 
Cooperation Must Pay 
The Kreps, Milgrom et al. (1982) model expects players to cooperate in the finitely repeated 
game if they believe cooperation will pay. Thus, cooperation should be the more pronounced 
the more a player experienced that cooperation indeed pays out. By not contributing to the 
                                                 
7   Mann Whitney u-test, NE 60 vs. Nox4, p = .0698; NE 20 vs. Nox4, p = .5957 (N = 18 in each 
comparison). The regression analyses are provided Table 2, Models 6&7. 
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project a participant can make sure to have at least her endowment as a payoff, irrespective of 
what the remaining active players do. This is why, as a benchmark of whether cooperation has 
paid, we compare last round’s payoff to the endowment of 20.  
The fixed effects model in Table 3
8 shows that participants are indeed sensitive to whether 
cooperation has paid in the past period. The more the payoff exceeded  20,  the more  a 
participant increases her contribution in the subsequent period. Actually, given the constant is 
significant and negative, it is not enough for the payoff to be slightly above 20 to induce 
participants to increase their contributions. The regression predicts that increases require a 
payoff of at least 27.
9 While the coefficient for past payoffs in the random effects model is 
squarely inconsistent, this model indicates that there are no significant treatment differences. 
Conditional on the difference between the past period’s payoff and 20, neither the direction of 
the externality nor the size of the bystanders’ endowment has explanatory power. 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  random effects  fixed effects 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 20  .139***  .200*** 
Nox7  -.146   
PE0  -.288   
PE20  -.143   
PE40  -.125   
NE20  -.139   
NE60  .039   
cons  -.985
+  -1.365*** 
N  2268  2268 
p model  <.001  <.001 
R
2 within  .2999  .1210 
R
2 between  .0517  .0450 
R
2 overall  .2220  .2227 
 
Table 3 
Sensitivity to Past Payoff 
Fixed effects instrumental variables regressions 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 20 instrumented by ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖  
standard errors from bootstrap, 50 reps, random draws of entire groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
In line with previous experimental observations we thus find  
Result 3: Subjects conditionally cooperate by increasing contributions when last period’s 
payoff exceeded the endowment and by reducing contributions when contributing has not paid  
                                                 
8  For a detailed explanation of our estimation strategy see Appendix B3. 
9  1.365/.02 = 6.825.   17 
This result clearly supports (H1b). However, as mentioned above, if this would already be the 
entire story, we should not expect to observe the pronounced  (unconditional)  treatment 
differences. In the following we thus investigate whether treatment differences may result 
from payoff comparisons, as suggested by models of inequity aversion.   
 
Payoff Differences Matter 
If  social preferences in the form of inequity aversion contribute to the explanation  of 
contribution behavior, active players should  react to the experiences they are making  in 
comparative terms, both in comparison with the other active players and, critically, with 
passive bystanders. To test this, we analyze the influence of last round payoff differences on 
the adjustment of participants’ contributions over time.  







.186***  .248*** 
Nox7  -.309   
PE0  -.278   
PE20  -.309   
PE40  -.278   
NE20  -.216   
NE60  -.123   
cons  -.278  -.494*** 
N  2268  2268 
p model  <.0234  <.001 
R
2 within  .4613  .2254 
R
2 between  .0809  .0734 
R
2 overall  .3514  .3521 
 
Table 4 
Sensitivity to Payoff Comparisons with other Active Players 
Fixed effects instrumental variables regressions 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 −
1
3∑ 𝜋𝑗,𝑡−1 𝑗≠𝑖  instrumented by ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖  
z-statistic for coefficient from mixed effects regression of lagged differences to remaining active players on their lagged average 
contributions 26.28, so that instrument is not weak 
standard errors from bootstrap, 50 reps, random draws of entire groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
In Table 4 the regressor for last period’s difference between the own payoff and the mean 
payoff of the remaining active players is highly significant. The positive coefficient shows 
adjustment to the mean. If the player has outperformed her peers, she increases her 
contribution. By contrast, the payoff difference is negative if she had contributed more than   18 
the average. The positive coefficient of a negative independent variable implies that such 
participants reduce their contributions in the subsequent period. The fixed effects regression 
predicts that participants decrease their contributions as long as the negative constant is not 
offset by a payoff advantage of at least two over the remaining active players.
10 Again, the 
(inconsistent) random effects model indicates that, conditional on the comparison with the 
remaining active players, there are no treatment differences. 
Result 4: Payoff comparisons to the other actors guide actors’ contributions: actors adjust 
their contribution in the direction of the mean of other actors’ last period’s contribution  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  random effects  fixed effects 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑏,𝑡−1  .127**  .181*** 
PE0  -1.799*   
PE20  .662   
PE40  3.244*   
NE20  -.752   
NE60  4.614**   
cons  -1.084*  .095
+ 
N  1944  1944 
p model  .1738  .0001 
R
2 within  .2670  .1103 
R
2 between  .0547  .0001 
R
2 overall  .1965  .0267 
 
Table 5 
Sensitivity to Payoff Comparisons with Bystanders 
Fixed effects instrumental variables regressions 
𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑏,𝑡−1 instrumented by ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟 𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗≠𝑖  
z-statistic for coefficient from mixed effects regression of lagged differences to remaining active players on their lagged average 
contributions 40.91, so that instrument is not weak 
standard errors from bootstrap, 50 reps, random draws of entire groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
The adjustment of actors’ contributions in the direction of the mean of other actors’ last 
period’s contribution may be driven by subjects holding intention based preferences, 
interdependent other regarding preferences, by repeated game effects, as discussed above, or 
by subjects holding social preferences in the form of inequity aversion. Payoff comparison to 
the bystanders should only matter if the last explanation holds true. In Table 5, we analyze 
how participants react to past differences between their own and bystander profit. The 
regressor is significant and positive. Thus, whenever there are bystanders, comparing their 
payoff with them guides active players’ behavior. The direction of the bystanders’ influence 
                                                 
10   .494/.248 = 1.99.   19 
depends on the sign of the payoff difference between actors and bystanders. When this 
difference is positive, i.e. when  actors outperform bystanders,  payoff comparisons to 
bystanders induce active players to increase contributions. When, however, bystanders have 
outperformed actors, their presence reduces contributions, no matter whether actors’ 
contributions actually affect bystanders or not. Thus, bystander comparisons and in particular 
the desire not to fall back behind bystanders explain the high contributions in PE0 and NE20, 
as seen in Figure 2A and Figure 3A, and the lower contributions in PE40 and NE60, as seen 
in Figure 2B and Figure 3B. Both observations are supportive for (H2b).  
The (inconsistent) random effects model in Table 5 suggests that active players are not only 
sensitive to comparative performance in the immediate past, but also react to the comparative 
position to the bystanders. By the design of the experiment in PE40 and NE60 active players 
are always outperformed by bystanders, hence  𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑏,𝑡−1  is always negative.  The 
positive treatment effect indicates that the reaction to payoff comparisons with bystanders is 
dampened. Active players do not reduce their contributions whenever they have been 
outperformed by bystanders, but only if they have fared much worse than bystanders.
11 By the 
same token, if the design of the experiment already makes sure that active players outperform 
bystanders (i.e. in PE0), they do not always react to this experience by an increase in 
contributions. This difference must be substantial if it is to trigger an upward adjustment.
12 
Figure 4 shows in which way payoff comparisons with passive bystanders are critical for 
treatment differences. In two treatments, contributions are not significantly different from the 
baseline Nox4: in PE0 and in NE20. This is precisely the treatments where the active players 
(almost) always outperform bystanders.  In the remaining treatments, at least some active 
players sometimes are worse off than bystanders. These are the treatments where 
contributions are lower than in a group with no bystanders. 
Result 5: Payoff comparisons to bystanders guide actors’ contributions. In particular, actors 
do not want to fall behind bystanders  
 
                                                 
11  In PE40, this requires a difference of more than 25 tokens (3.244/.127 = 25.54). In NE60, the model predicts a 
reduction of contributions if bystanders outperformed the active player by at least 36 tokens (4.614/.127 = 
36.33). In both treatments, the cutoff is below the mean difference between active players and bystanders. 
12  Specifically, the difference must be above 14 tokens (1.799/.127 = 14.13). This is, however, below the mean 
difference.   20 
 
Figure 4 
Difference Between Actor and Bystander Payoff 
Values to the left of 0 result from actors having a lower payoff than bystanders  
Values to the right of 0 result from actors having a higher payoff than bystanders 
histograms are over individual differences per active player and period 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Local public goods frequently spill over to bystanders by either bestowing a windfall profit or 
by inflicting harm on them. In this paper we show that externalities on bystanders reduce the 
willingness to contribute to a public good whenever actors risk a competitive disadvantage, 
compared with bystanders. Actually, the mere salience of a benchmark group suffices to 
dampen the willingness to contribute to a public good. We explain these findings by the 
interaction of two effects: sensitivity to the cooperativeness of other active players and, at the 
same time, the concern for comparative performance. Individual payoff comparisons with 
respect to the other actors as well as individual bystanders drive contributions down. As long 
as they cannot fall behind bystanders, actors contribute as much to their joint project as if 
bystanders were not present. Even a windfall profit for bystanders may be tolerable as long as 
the additional gain does not make bystanders more prosperous than those contributing to the 
public good. By contrast if active players run the serious risk of receiving a smaller payoff 























difference between actor and bystander payoff  21 
One must, of course, be cautious when deriving recommendations for institutional design 
from lab results; context may well suggest otherwise. That said, our findings might help 
policy  makers understand why some  social dilemmas are  particularly hard to dissolve. 
According to our results, the proper definition of groups is crucial to whom individuals 
compare themselves.  In particular the comparison of Nox4  with  Nox7  suggests that the 
perception of a larger reference group matters even if membership is not at stake. It suffices if 
a political intervention changes which reference group is made salient. If the reference group 
transcends the set of active members, voluntary contributions to a public good entail two risks 
at a time: the risk of being exploited by free-riders at the interior, and the risk of falling 
behind the external benchmark. Note that such interventions leave the structure of the game 
unchanged. All that is affected is group construction. When a village close to the national 
border joins a cross-border association of municipalities, as in the Trans European regions, 
other members of the association become a natural benchmark for comparisons. A striking 
example was German reunification. Economically, the new Länder would have been much 
better off had they tolerated a considerably weaker currency, substantially lower wages, and a 
less generous system of social security. Yet politically it was impossible not to treat them 
equally. At the then time the issue was not discussed in these terms. Yet arguably the 
willingness to voluntarily contribute to the many public goods without which an industrialized 
country cannot thrive could not have been created in the East, had Easterners had reason to 
perceive themselves as citizens of second-class. 
By contrast, if the difference in prosperity is unquestionable, the fact that they are bestowing a 
windfall profit on outsiders might not prevent groups from contributing to a joint project. This 
might, for instance, explain why most industrialized countries have helped create international 
organizations like the World Trade Organization, even if their efforts also were to the benefit 
of threshold countries. While the willingness to tolerate positive spillovers may often be 
normatively desirable, a lack of reticence to impose harm on outsiders is more troubling. 
Actually, our experimental findings even indicate that insiders might find the negative side 
effect desirable, precisely because this helps reduce the original distance between themselves 
and another group. Against this backdrop, it is at least partly comforting that the effect seems 
less likely if insiders perceive outsiders as inferior. If their individual and social superiority is 
not at risk, they are not likely to cooperate more fiercely precisely because this harms 
outsiders.     22 
Appendix A Instructions  
 




•  At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly split into 3 groups of 7 members. During the 
whole experiment you will only interact with members of your group.  
•  The experiment consists of 3 phases. First you will be informed about phase 1. You will learn about the 
rules of the next phase as soon as the previous phase has been terminated. Please note: The decisions you make 
in one phase do not affect the range of possibilities you have at your disposal in any later phases. 
 
Information for phase 1: 
•  There are two types of players: active and passive players. There are 4 active players and 3 passive 
players. At the beginning of phase 1 it will be randomly determined whether you are an active or a passive 
player. Your type will remain unchanged for the whole duration of phase 1. 
•  You play 10 rounds, every round will have the same structure.  
•  Each active and each passive player receives an endowment of 20 points in each round.  
 
Active players: Each active player has to decide how many of the 20 points he/she wants to contribute to the 
public good. All points contributed to the public good will be multiplied by 1.6 and equally split among all 4 
active players, i.e. for every point contributed to the public good by an active player, every active player 
receives 0.4 (=1.6/4). Points not contributed to the public good will stay with the player. More precisely, each 
active player has to choose one of the following three options: 
•  Contribute 0 points and keep 20 points, 
•  Contribute 10 points and keep 10 points or 
•  Contribute 20 points and keep 0 points 
 
Passive players: Passive players cannot contribute to the public good. The payoff of the passive players 
depends on the contributions of the active players. For each point contributed to the public good by an active 
player, each passive player receives 0.2 points.  
 
Payoff per round: 
for active players:  20 – points contributed + 0.4 x sum of the contribution of all active players 
for passive players:  20 +  0.2 x sum of the contribution of all active players 
 
Example 
If the four active players contribute 0, 10, 10 und 20 (arranged by amount), the sum of contributions by all 
active players is 40 and each active player receives 0.4x40=16 from the joint project. The individual payoffs per 
round of the active players depend on the amounts contributed and are: 
•  for the player who contributed 0:  20 –   0 + 16 = 36  
•  for the player who contributed 10:  20 – 10 + 16 = 26 and 
•  for the player who contributed 20:  20 – 20 + 16 = 16. 
•   
The payoff per round for each passive player is 20 + 0.2x40 = 28. 
Payoff 
Each player receives a base rate of € 4 once. At the end of the experiment the points will be paid in Euro with 
the exchange rate: 10 points are 0.15 €.   23 
All other PE instructions were analogous. Instructions in NE differ in the passage describing 
the passive player, the passage describing the payoff and the example. In NE20, these parts 
read as: 
Passive players: Passive players cannot contribute to the public good. The payoff of the passive players 
depends on the contributions of the active players. For each point contributed to the public good by an active 
player, each passive player receives a deduction of 0.2 points.  
Payoff per round: 
for active players:  20 – points contributed + 0.4 x sum of the contribution of all active players 
for passive players:  20 –  0.2 x sum of the contribution of all active players 
 
Example 
If the four active players contribute 0, 10, 10 und 20 (arranged by amount), the sum of contributions by all 
active players is 40 and each active player receives 0.4x40=16 from the joint project. The individual payoffs per 
round of the active players depend on the amounts contributed and are: 
•  for the player who contributed 0:  20 –   0 + 16 = 36  
•  for the player who contributed 10:  20 – 10 + 16 = 26 and 
•  for the player who contributed 20:  20 – 20 + 16 = 16. 
 
The payoff per round for each passive player is 20 – 0.2x40 = 12. 
 
Instructions in the control treatment Nox7 differ in the passage describing the passive player, 
the passage describing the payoff and the example. These parts read as: 
Passive players: Passive players cannot contribute to the public good. The payoff of the passive players does 
also not depend on the contributions of the active players.  
Payoff per round: 
for active players:  20 – points contributed + 0.4 x sum of the contribution of all active players 
for passive players:  20  
 
Example 
If the four active players contribute 0, 10, 10 und 20 (arranged by amount), the sum of contributions by all 
active players is 40 and each active player receives 0.4x40=16 from the joint project. The individual payoffs per 
round of the active players depend on the amounts contributed and are: 
•  for the player who contributed 0:  20 –   0 + 16 = 36  
•  for the player who contributed 10:  20 – 10 + 16 = 26 and 
•  for the player who contributed 20:  20 – 20 + 16 = 16. 
 
The payoff per round for each passive player is 20  
   24 
Appendix B. Supplementary material  
 
Predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model 
 
In the presence of bystanders, inequity may occur with respect to both the other actors and the 
bystanders. Then, the Fehr-Schmidt model reads as: 
(3) 
{ } { }
{ } { }
1 0 ,
0 , max 0 , max
1
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The utility of actor i is composed of the actor’s monetary payoff 
A
i π , reduced by the utility 
loss from disadvantageous payoff differences (second line in (3)) and the utility loss from 
advantageous payoff differences (third line in (3)). Actors weight disadvantageous inequality 
with  i α  and advantageous inequality with  i β .  
The unique Nash equilibrium under the assumption of monetary payoff maximization, i.e. 
complete free-riding of all actors, is also an equilibrium in this version of the Fehr-Schmidt 
model. In their Proposition 4 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive necessary conditions for 
equilibria in the standard public goods game. We extend this proposition to the case of 
bystanders and apply it to our treatment parameterizations. As in FS, let k denote the number 
of players with  1 < + i a β . These players have no (marginal) incentive to contribute to the 
public good, because the cost of 1 of contributing one unit is not compensated by the 
monetary return a of this unit and the non-monetary benefit from reducing advantageous 
inequality  i β .  For these players free-riding is a dominant strategy. If the number of these 
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there is a unique equilibrium with zero contributions for all actors. The critical value of Nox4 
corresponds to the one in the standard public goods game (cf. Prop. 4b of FS). In the presence   25 
of bystanders the comparison to bystanders enters the actors’ profitability calculations. The 
number of “free-riders” that is “tolerable” for an equilibrium with positive contributions then 
depends on the number of bystanders  B n  and the difference in the marginal benefits of actors 
and bystanders  b a− . The presence of unaffected bystanders ( 0 > B n  and  0 = b ), as in Nox7, 
does not change the critical value of k as compared to Nox4. Absent any bystanders ( 0 = B n ), 
the second and third distinction in inequality (4) coincide with the first one. 
Table B1 provides the critical values for k in our treatment parameterization. The negative 
critical values in PE20, PE40, and NE60 express that the equilibrium with zero contributions 
of all players is the unique equilibrium, even if there is no single player satisfying  1 < + i a β . 
In Nox4, Nox7, PE0, and NE20, however, there might be positive contribution equilibria, but 
only if there are no players satisfying  1 < + i a β . The final column of table B1 shows that in 
these treatments equilibria with positive contributions are possible if all actors heavily suffer 
from advantageous inequality, i.e. have very high  β  values. All treatments demand for even 
more extreme aversion to advantageous inequality than the control Nox4. In their part (c) of 
proposition 4, FS additionally deduce conditions for the existence of asymmetric equilibria in 
which the players with  1 < + i a β  contribute 0, while the others contribute positive amounts. 
These are possible, if the number of players with  1 < + i a β  is even lower than the bounds 
deduced in (4). These calculations can also be generalized to the case of bystanders. We will, 
however, refrain from presenting them here, because – as shown in table B1 – our treatments 
do not “tolerate” even a single player with  1 < + i a β . This means that our treatments do not 
allow for asymmetric equilibria. 
Treatment  Critical value for the number k 
of players with  1 < + i a β  
Minimum aversion against advantageous 
inequity for  (10,10,10,10) and (20,20,20,20) 
to be a FS-equilibria 
Nox4  0.6  i i ∀ = > 60 . 0 5
3 β  
Nox7  0.6  i i ∀ = > 75 . 0 4
3 β  
PE0  0.9  i i ∀ ≈ > 67 . 0 3
2 β  
PE20  -1.5  - 
PE40  -1.5  - 
NE20  0.3  i i ∀ ≈ > 86 . 0 7
6 β  
NE60  -0.9  - 
 
Table B1 
Ranges of inequity parameters   26 
 
Box B.1 Estimation strategy for the parametric analysis of treatment effects 
 
Each participant decides every period how much she wants to contribute. Per subject, data is therefore 
correlated over time. We capture this relatedness by a subject specific error term, i.e. by a random 
effects model. Moreover if we analyse contributions, our dependent variable only has 3 expressions: 
0, 10, and 20. (Random effects) ordered probit then is the appropriate functional form. We thus work 
with the following model: 
it i it y ε α β + + = it x *  
where  * it y  is a latent variable that varies over participants and periods.  it x is a vector of period and 
participant specific explanatory variables, with corresponding coefficient vector β .  i α   is a 
participant specific error term, while  it ε  is residual error. Two cutoffs  1 γ  and  2 γ  are estimated with 
the model. The model predicts variable  it y  to have expression 0 with probability  *) ( ) 0 ( it y cdf p − = 1 γ . 
By the same token, contributions of 20 are predicted with probability  *) ( 1 ) 20 ( it y cdf p − − = 2 γ , and 
*) | 20 ( *) | 0 ( 1 *) | 10 ( it it it y p y p y p − − = . 
Participants stay together in groups of four (seven) over the entire game, which causes our data to be 
related within groups. In principle, a GLS mixed effects model would be the appropriate way to 
correct standard errors. Unfortunately, for random effects ordered probit models, there is no generally 
acknowledged way to do this. We therefore revert to bootstrapping, with drawings at the group level. 
This gives us standard errors that correct for the relatedness of observations within groups. 
This approach still has one limitation. There is no generally acknowledged fixed effects estimator for 
ordered probit models. Consequently, we are also unable to perform the Hausman test. We must 
assume that  i α  and  it x are uncorrelated. As a double check we run both a random effects and a fixed 
effects model that ignore the fact that our data only has three expressions and  is  clustered, and 
perform the Hausman test on this mirror model. 
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Box B2: Reading and interpretation aid of Table 2 
 
 
As explained in Box B1, the latent variable does not directly map to probabilities, but to a z-
standardised normal distribution. To recover the probabilities, one calculates the cumulative 
distribution function of the lower cutoff, minus the predicted value of the latent variable, to get the 
probability of a contribution of 0. By the same token, the probability of contributing 20 results from 1 
minus the cdf of the upper cut, minus the predicted value of the latent variable. The probability of 
contributing 10 is 1 minus the two other probabilities.  
Consider the first period in treatment Nox4. In this case the first regressor is 0; only the second 
regressor matters, and has expression 1.  The probability that a participant contributes 0 in this 
situation is given by cdf (-.596 [cut 10] – (1*-.096 [period])) = 30.85%. The probability that a 
participant contributes 20 is given by 1 – cdf (.730 [cut 20] – (1*-.096 [period])) = 20.44 %. The 
probability that the participant contributes 10 is 100 – 24.45 – 26.30 = 48.71 %. By contrast, in the 
remaining treatments, the probability that a participant contributes 0 in the first period is given by cdf 
(-.596 [cut 10] – (-.299 [not Nox4] + (1*-.096 [period])) = 42.03 %. The probability that a participant 
contributes 20 is given by 1 – cdf (.730 – (-.299 [not Nox4] + (1*-.096 [period])) = 13.03 %, which 
leaves a probability of 44.94 % that such a participant contributes 10. Hence according to the model it 
is considerably less likely that a participant contributes 0 in the first period of the baseline, and it is 
considerably more likely that she contributes 20. 
 
 
Box B3: Estimation strategy for the analysis of contribution dynamics 
In the analysis of contribution dynamics, we face a technical challenge. Dynamics express themselves 
in first differences, i.e. in 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑡−1. We aim at explaining changes in contributions with 
experiences participants have made in the previous period like 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 20. Now by the design of a 
public good 




Hence if we estimate  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑡−1 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1 ∗ �𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 − 20� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
the term 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 is on both sides of the equation, which generates endogeneity. We could replace 





or, dividing this by 3, by their average contributions, which do not suffer from this problem. Actually 
if we explain contribution changes by this variable, we have a highly significant result in the expected 
direction: participants increase their contributions the more, the more the remaining group members 
have contributed in the previous period. Yet this estimation strategy deprives us of the possibility to 
discriminate between driving forces, and hence between theoretical explanations for conditional 
cooperation.  
We overcome this problem by instrumentation. All explanatory variables of interest are highly 
correlated with the average contribution of others to the public good, in the previous period. This 
already follows from the design of the experiment, and is corroborated if we explain the respective 
explanatory variable by lagged average contributions of others.
13 We therefore clearly do not have a 
weak instrument. On the other hand the dependent variable, i.e. the first differences of contributions of 
participant 𝑖 in period 𝑡, are not correlated with the contribution choices of the remaining participants 
in the previous period. Hence we have a valid instrument. 
On top, we face the usual challenges resulting from the fact that the data from public goods is nested 
in individuals, nested in groups. Ideally we would therefore want to estimate a mixed effects model. 
Yet there is no generally acknowledged mixed effects model that allows for instrumentation. We 
therefore estimate a random effects instrumental variables regression (to cater for dependence at the 
level of individuals), which we bootstrap with random draws of entire groups (to cater for the 
dependence at the level of groups). Finally differences of estimated coefficients between fixed and 
random effects models are big enough to cast doubt on the consistency of the random effects 
estimator. Since the fixed effects estimator works with mean differencing, and thereby removes the 




                                                 
13  In a mixed effects regression of the lagged difference of profit from 20 on the lagged average contribution of 
others, with standard errors for contributions nested in individuals nested in groups, i.e. with random effects for 
individuals and groups, with have a z-value of 54.43, Wald Chi2 (1) = 2962.22. Note that from this model we do 
not get an F-statistic.    29 
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